Some practices were blatantly antidemocratic: U.S. support for authoritarian regimes, American involvement in the assassination of foreign citizens and in the bribery and manipulation of foreign elections, and the provision of U.S. aid in overthrowing undesirable governments. Further, the messianic and Manichaean vision used to justify these policies-the forces of democratic good fighting totalitarian evil-meant a willingness to impose American values on others that was contrary to the tolerance, pluralism, and spirit of compromise that the country publicly embraced.
Such a nondemocratic security apparatus could exist within a constitutional democracy because of the balance forged between the two systems in the early postwar period. This balance had three components. First, an anticommunist ideology deleted all debate about the security mission and methods from the political agenda. Communism had to be contained, and because communists were as unscrupulous as they were expansionist, the argument went, international politics was an anarchic Hobbesian struggle. Too much constitutional restraint or moral scruple would make the United States vulnerable. So self-preservation demanded the creation of a security leviathan with power enough to establish a safe world order and capable, when necessary, of fighting dirty. At the same time, the anticommunism had to square with America's national idealism. Public exercises of power needed to glisten with high moral principle, so dirty deeds needed to be made covert and used only as a last resort.
Second, the sphere of national security operations had to be limited. A boundary would be drawn around Americans' domestic lives, and the leviathan would be kept outside. Third, the security system would not be granted full autonomy, even abroad, because that would be a danger and an offense to basic constitutional principles. The National Security Act, for example, said that the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, lawenforcement powers, or internal-security functions." The power of the purse would provide the ultimate control. The leviathan was put on a leash, albeit a long one.
Forging the actual substance of this balance, however, involved fierce struggles within the government over the specific content of the legitimating ideology, the boundaries, and the controls.
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The postwar balance was imposed only after President Harry Truman unleashed an anticommunist crusade that destroyed the progressive Wallace wing of the Democratic party and then spawned McCarthyism and its decimation of all organized "leftist" opposition. But since the widespread opposition to the Vietnam War, the struggle to restore a proper balance has been shaped by the domestic reaction to the decline of U.S. hegemony. Exerting American will in Southeast Asia exacted a high cost at home and created enormous reluctance to sacrifice the national treasure, the lives of American citizens and the country's moral self-image. The bipartisan consensus thus was undermined: Foreign policies were challenged and the balance between the two systems was lost, at least temporarily. When attempts by national security elites to achieve a policy consensus by using "lower cost" tactics, such as Nixon's Vietnamization program and Reagan's contra war, proved inadequate, policymakers sought ways to shelter better the security apparatus and its policies from domestic opposition. This generated another struggle. Covert operations spilled over into domestic life as the government crossed the boundary set up between domestic and international affairs to quell opposition at home. Administrations tried to undermine public control, burrowing deeper into secret chambers and inventing new mechanisms, such as the intricate private arms transfer networks created to ship weapons to Iran in the Reagan administration, to circumvent the law and the Constitution. Officials attempted to shore up the legitimacy of the security system by exaggerating threats, inflaming fears, and reinterpreting the president's constitutional powers-all of which corrupted trust and undercut the public's right to elect leaders on the basis of what the government had done. The illegal bombing of Cambodia and the Watergate and Iran-contra scandals represent the public surfacing of this struggle.
Nixon's Secret Bombing
The military aim of the Cambodia bombings was to destroy North Vietnamese sanctuaries. However, a more important political motive existed. Basic to Nixon's strategy for ending the Vietnam War and bringing about "peace with honor" were the slow withdrawal of American troops 23. Growing public opposition, however, made further escalation politically difficult. Johnson was forced to halt troop escalation, and Nixon felt compelled to withdraw soldiers and adopt Vietnamization. But this lower-cost policy did not allow Nixon to force the negotiated settlement he wanted. He needed both to demonstrate his political will through the attacks on Cambodia and to avoid domestic opposition by creating the clandestine network. The secret bombing dramatized how far a president faced with strong domestic opposition was willing to go to free the national security system from constitutional and democratic controls.
The cold war made rational the growth of a powerful security apparatus ruled by an "imperial president."
If Cambodia demonstrated how difficult it was becoming to control the security system abroad, Watergate showed how the security system could spill over into life at home. Covert activities once aimed at America's enemies abroad suddenly were used against domestic enemies-those who opposed Nixon's foreign policies and threatened his bid for re-election.
Watergate often is misremembered simply as "a botched burglary, a campaign of dirty tricks and an attempted cover-up of those miserable deeds," as 
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Act of 1973, which set a 60-day limit on the use of U.S. troops in hostile areas without a declaration of war or congressional authorization, and the creation of congressional intelligence oversight committees to monitor the CIA. The public revulsion at secrecy, lying, and distortion led to a significant increase in investigative reporting, most notably during the unravel- By themselves, however, these strategies did not prevent public, media, and congressional resistance. Therefore the administration sought to rebuild the shield that in the past had protected security policy from public controls. There also was some evidence of Watergate-like activities as the FBI scrutinized the political activities of American critics of U.S. Central America policy, and as more than 20 break-ins occurred nationwide at offices of groups opposing the policy. But domestic covert operations-harassment and spying--were not the main event. First, the armor of legitimacy would be refurbished. The administration struggled, with some success, to revive the fears of Soviet expansionism that justified its policies and to clothe its actions in righteousness.
Drawing on the moral messianism that is so deeply rooted in American culture, the president portrayed the Soviet Union as the "evil empire," the contras as "freedom fighters" who are the "moral equivalent of our founding fathers," the Nicaraguan government as a "totalitarian dungeon," and the United States as a "shining city." Buchanan, as the Reagan White House communications director, argued that the Democratic party's stance on contra aid revealed "whether it stands with Ronald Reagan and the resistance-or Daniel Ortega and the communists."9 The flavor of McCarthyism usually was only subtly invoked, but people remembered, and many moderates fell into line or went on the defensive. Second, the security apparatus would be insulated from public control by restricting and manipulating information to limit policy debate. Still, the mirrored surface of legitimacy and its dark underside of secrecy were not by themselves sufficient to block critical, contrary information and troubling opposition. The wax of moral mission washed off the contras as fast as it was rubbed on, as well-documented reports of contra human rights violations continued steadily. Starting in 1984, Congress shifted from quietly overseeing the contra war to voting openly against U.S. funding for the rebels. The administration then took another route: circumventing congressional controls.
The mechanisms designed to strengthen constitutional controls were perverted so that policy could be insulated from control. The covert operations that the Senate select committee had reluctantly allowed in "extraordinary circumstances" in 1975 were turned into the very "parallel but invisible system" of "routine" operations that the committee had warned against. Casey made covert wars an important, routine CIA instrument for carrying out the Reagan Doctrine in Afghan-32.
istan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. Even when duly reported to congressional intelligence committees, the use of covert operations to make and change foreign policy stifled public debate and limited congressional opposition to only the most extreme cases. The letter, as well as the spirit, of the law was violated. The fundamental purpose of requiring a presidential finding and "timely" reporting of covert operations to Congress was to ensure consultation during, if not before, implementation. However, when the White House initiated the armsfor-hostages deal with Iran, Reagan signed a finding and then deliberately kept it hidden in a safe, presenting it only when the illegal activity was revealed 10 months later.
Reagan administration officials circumvented congressional restrictions on funding simply by institutionalizing loopholes in the appropriations process. The president used his defense "drawdown" authority to tap special funds that had of the 1984 Boland amendment, which prevented any government agency from directly or indirectly providing support, the administration initiated its most innovative and dangerous effort to date-a semiprivate network in which government security managers subcontracted out security policy and financed it with private contributions and donations from foreign governments. This secret network was the most blatant attempt to protect administration doctrine from constitutional and democratic controls since those controls had been reinvigorated in the wake of Vietnam.
Aberrationists versus Legalists
In each of the three scandals the struggle between the national security system and constitutional democracy surfaced from beneath the cover of secrecy, but the public debate was often misleadingly narrow. In a common pattern, the "aberrationists" locked horns with the "legalists."
Aberrationists focus on people's failures. Problems in human character-ambition, ignorance, overzealous patriotism, disrespect for the laws, dishonesty-occasionally cause an "aberration," as former Texas Republican Senator John Tower, who chaired the President's Special Review Board, described the Iran-contra affair. But aberrationists see the relationship between the national security system and constitutional democracy as fundamentally sound. The Iran-contra affair was "a mistake, not a scandal," asserted Representative Newt Gingrich (R.-Georgia). It was a series of "blunders," according to Senator Robert Dole (R.-Kansas). The scandal was caused, said the Tower commission, by Reagan's "management style" and by "unprofessional" NSC staff behavior.
The legalists often accept bad people as the cause, but, like the Founding Fathers, they assume that abuses of power are inevitable unless checked by institutional restraints. New legislation and possibly constitutional controls are needed to prevent such abuses from happening again. As Allan Goodman, a former CIA official, argued, "The CIA made mistakes that are not unique to the politics and personalities involved in the Iran-contra affair but that represent major defects in the country's system of intelligence sup-34.
port to foreign policy."" The threat of new controls often spurs a refreshing bluntness among defenders of the security system. National security and constitutional democracy often are in conflict, they say, but saving constitutional democracy may require partially sacrificing it. In 1948 the diplomatic historian Thomas Bailey put it bluntly in The Man in the Street:
Deception of the people may in fact become increasingly necessary unless we are willing to give our leaders in Washington a freer hand. ... Just as the yielding of some of our national sovereignty is the price that we must pay for effective international organization, so the yielding of some of our democratic control of foreign affairs is the price that we may have to pay for greater physical security.
Nixon echoed this defense when he explained to a British television interviewer in 1977 that illegal acts are not illegal when the president orders them.
If the President .... approves something, approves an action because of national security, or ... because of a threat to internal peace and order of significant magnitude, then the President's decision in that instance is one that enables those who carry it out to carry it out without violating a law.12
And as the Iran-contra affair was unfolding, the commentator Charles Krauthammer, actually a strong legalist, argued in the February 9, 1987, issue of the New Republic that "imperial responsibility demands imperial government" and secrecy and that this will to an extent "constitute a diminution of democracy," but that it is a price worth paying to protect American democracy from "a totalitarian threat."
These arguments are revealing because they concede that the problem goes beyond the failures of individuals. When domestic opposition threatens policies crucial to exercising imperial responsibility or projects an image of weakness damaging to U.S. credibility, security elites are tempted to undercut constitutional controls or to quell opponents. Nixon knew that potential congressional opposition could be mobilized to block funding if he expanded the Vietnam War, especially after he had promised to wind it down. He 
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the means of exposing and controlling abuses of authority, and with widespread knowledge of these abuses, why was there no uproar? Why were Congress and the press so cowardly before the Iran-contra affair broke in November 1986? To be fair, there was some protest-a hearing, a rebuke, a slap on the wrist. From 1983 on, some members of Congress protested a variety of possible illegalities: alleged violations of the Boland amendments, the use of military-exercise funds to build bases in Honduras, the CIA's failure to inform congressional intelligence committees of its 1984 mining of Nicaraguan harbors, and former NSC aide Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North's early involvement in the private contra aid network. But only those who strongly opposed the actual policies were willing to protest the abuses of constitutional authority. Those who shared the president's aims opposed strong sanctions against the executive. Just as in the case of Cambodia, they read the Constitution to emphasize the president's role as commander in chief and tolerated the illegal circumvention with a wink and a nod. Even after the Cambodian revelations, the House Judiciary Committee dropped the impeachment charge against Nixon because prowar Republicans would not have supported it and because the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana, and other Senate Democrats had known about the secret bombing but kept quiet. Obedience to the law, checks and balances, honesty and trust, the power of the purse, specified war powers-all fundamental to constitutional democracy-were considered secondary by those who wanted Nixon to have free rein over national security issues.
More recently, the political will of the opposition likewise was weakened by an unwillingness to challenge the overall ends of the Central America policy. While many moderates feared the commitment of U.S. troops, criticized the covert operations, and protested the law breaking, they shared the assumption that revolutionary regimes of the left were antithetical to U.S. global interests and that the United States could not stand by idly and allow communism to spread unchecked. And when the arms sales to Iran were revealed, some in Congress who condemned the policy were nevertheless willing to accept the premise that the initiative represented a strategic opening to Iran 39.
aimed at keeping out the Soviets. Only when it became widely accepted that the intent of the sales was to trade arms for hostages--outrageous even to conservatives-were enough members of Congress willing to demand investigations. To defend constitutional democracy against the security system, the imbalance between the two must be corrected. The security leviathan must not be allowed to roam freely abroad or to encroach on domestic political institutions. But the political will is not present to enforce even the weak restraints of the post-Vietnam legislation, let alone more significant measures that would redress the balance, such as forbidding covert actions or restricting the CIA purely to intelligence gathering. Ultimately, the leviathan is protected by the legitimating shield of "national security." Defining national security, in essence, as hegemony-as carrying an imperial responsibilitymeans accepting the basic structure of the security system, and this limits the political will to demand obedience to the law, protection of dissent, access to information, public debate and scrutiny, executive accountability, and even honesty.
But these scandals should make more suspect the claims that restrictions harm America's standing in the world. In all three cases, the very covert policies responding to perceived threats to constitutional democracy became greater threats themselves to U.S. national security. The secret bombing of Cambodia only temporarily disrupted North Vietnamese supply lines, failed to frighten Hanoi into negotiations, and, far worse, encouraged the North to move its sanctuaries and supply lines deeper inside Cambodia. This development brought the North into increased conflict with Cambodian villagers and troops and helped destabilize the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. His overthrow in 1970 allowed the war to spread into once neutral Cambodia and set into motion events that led to the takeover by the Marxist Cambodian leader Pol Pot's genocidal Khmer Rouge. The Vietnam policy itself, which created the logic for Cambodia and Watergate and for the abuses of authority in three administrations, was a disaster for human life, national strength, and international credibility.
Trading arms for hostages in the Iran-contra dealings exposed Washington's empty "no concessions" policy toward terrorists, damaged Amer-40.
